# THE GREAT ARCH

English State Formation as
Cultural Revolution

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

IDEAS

this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people of its own social life. It [is] not a Revolution to transfer it from one faction of the ruling classes to another, but a Revolution to break down this horrid machinery of class domination itself. (1871: 150–1)

This revolution too has deep roots and long traditions, in all that state formation has organized itself, and sought to organize us, against. There is more to do than look back in anger. Imagine.

# Postscript

Whether, as Mark Kishlansky informed readers of *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, *The Great Arch* uses as its principal source 'textbooks, preferably written by Marxists', and treats as its 'predominant authority . . . on all subjects from the Middle Ages to the 18th century' Christopher Hill, is a question we think we can safely leave to readers to decide.[1] Elsewhere this book has met with the 'serious, reasoned response' called for by G. E. Aylmer in his Foreword. It has been widely and for the most part favourably reviewed across a range of disciplines. Our argument that state formation is cultural revolution has been taken up and fruitfully extended by others, often working in areas far removed from English history. Obviously this is gratifying. At the same time, those who were most generous in their praises for what we were seeking to do were seldom slow to point to shortcomings in its execution. For such criticism – serious, and reasoned – we are as grateful. We shall try here to respond to some of these concerns. While there is nothing in this book we would disavow, there is much we would now nuance, elaborate or clarify.

Parts of our narrative are weaker than others, or in some cases call for a major rethinking in the light of work published after *The Great Arch* was written. We would not, for instance, today blithely assert that 'most authorities would agree' that it was the Norman Conquest which did the most to create England's strong and centralized medieval governance. The labours of James Campbell and Patrick Wormald on the heritage of the later Anglo-Saxon state (and its own Carolingian models) deserve better.[2] Probably too we did not pay sufficient attention to revisionist historiographies of the seventeenth century, although they did not go entirely unmentioned. Their great value lies in their empirical detail, which has the power to undermine the grand abstractions in which this portion of the story has far too often been told. In regard to conclusions, however, there is little we would alter here. Debates among historians tend towards the either/or. We continue to believe both that England's was in important ways

a fundamentally different kind of polity after 1689 than before 1640, and that the upheavals which occurred between those dates cannot, without very considerable violence of abstraction, be characterized as 'the bourgeois revolution', England's '*1789*'. Other recent work (Furet, Schama) suggests that the significance of that date as the birthdate of political modernity is in any case overstated. This is especially true in regard to gender, where any epochal rupture in the organization of power is exceedingly difficult to detect. France too had its *longue durée*.

Perhaps the least satisfactory section of this book is the chapter on the eighteenth century. As Jonathan Barry has noted, this in part reflects uncertainties of the historiography in 1984–5.[3] A veritable explosion of work since is redefining the field and providing invaluably detailed resources for resolving the puzzle of the connections between politeness and commerce, to echo Paul Langford. As matters stand, we would want to change neither the overall 'Thompsonian' emphases of the chapter – on the triumph of capitalistic relations and disciplines within the *sui generis* Hanoverian polity – nor the argument that this century witnessed the emergence of a new project, that of Society regulating (or as Eric Wolf puts it, 'inventing')[4] society. Hugh Emy's criticism of our treatment of the 1750–1830 period, that the dimensions of this cultural revolution may have been 'greater or more dramatic than the authors convey', entailing transformations 'not only in work habits, social relations, or technology', but equally 'the crystalization (or objectification) of new concepts of society, economy, and "interest"', is somewhat disconcerting here. This was, we thought, the burden of our discussion of its contemporary theorizations (pp. 104–9). Both of us have since extended this argument in more general terms elsewhere.[5] We tried to bring out the ensuing contradictoriness for most people of their 'economic' subordination, *a.k.a.* class, and their abstract subjectivities as citizens of what Benedict Anderson calls the 'imagined community' of the nation state. This too we stand by – *emphatically*.

But we would now wish to tell this story with a good deal more refinement, taking due account of recent innovative studies. These often pull in rather different directions. J. C. D. Clark, for example, characterizes this period as an *ancien régime* in which the holy trinity of Anglicanism, aristocracy and monarchy remain integral to the body politic. His stress on the enduring importance of religion is salutory: on this subject we might well have said more throughout the book. John Brewer emphasizes the efficiency for raising taxes and financing wars of the *Sinews of Power*, a 'modernist' characteristic not normally associated with Old Corruption. These varying emphases, we would argue, are not necessarily incompatible except when viewed through



teleological lenses, and it was this both/and quality of the century itself that we attempted to sustain. But it could undoubtedly be done better. Not only do we ignore the Bank of England – as David Levine pointed out, an astonishing omission! The whole question of the eighteenth-century financial revolution needed more attention. Brewer highlights the crucial role which capacity to tax played in the revolution in borrowing by sustaining the confidence of creditors in payment of interest. Equally, studies by Landau and Beattie on the law, or Rogers, Colley and others on alternative structures of politics permit a far more nuanced account of the transformation of England's civil society, and the making of that public whose early nineteenth-century voices we quoted, than we gave.

As germane to our themes, but for the most part little discussed here, are two by now very considerable bodies of work: studies of how power operates at the local level, and that field which for want of a better term we might describe as demographic and family histories. Macfarlane, Laslett, Levine and Seccombe have related England being the classic ground of capitalism to its marital regimes, though differing over the nature and timing of the relation. Macfarlane connects this 'Malthusian marriage system' explicitly to England's medieval peculiarities in state formation, relating the 'English individualism' of which he wrote in 1978 to effective kingship and Common Law. It was formations of state which sustained (and enforced) an ethos of calculation, detaching 'the individual' as a subject from wider bonds, whether familial or feudal. As might perhaps be expected, we would want to stress the masculinity and the propertiedness of this abstract individual, and the forcibility with which He was made the moral paradigm. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Wrightson and Levine's 'village elites' were engaged in effective moral regulation both of themselves and their poorer neighbours, enforcing particular norms of responsibility in sexual and marital matters. It was instrumentalities of state, like the Poor Law, which empowered them to do so.[6] Such work also – if this be still needed – vindicates our stress on the intrinsically gendered character and implications of state formation. We would now seek to go further down this road. Recent studies like Susan Dwyer Amussen's *An Ordered Society* show, in much more detail than we attempted, how taking the gender of Hobbes's Mortall God seriously results in a different – and very much fuller – picture of the foundations of social and political order than that usually painted by social theorists and historians of the state. For later periods so do the writings of Leonora Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Carolyn Steedman and others. These are works which unravel the intimate relations of multiple 'public' and 'private' spheres fundamental to state formation. This is a question neither of a mere

filling of gaps, nor of providing a women's history – necessary as that task undoubtedly is – but of transforming perspectives on what 'the state' is. Patriarchy was a critical means and metaphor of social power throughout the long period we surveyed.

Two more general problems also call for comment, though in this case we signalled them ourselves (pp. 11–13). These are the external contexts – of competing states and imperial projects – and the internal struggles of English state formation. Bulpitt criticizes us both for our presentation of Wales, Scotland and Ireland as 'mere objects of English domination' and for our failure 'to stress the impact of external pressures'. Levine takes us to task for saying almost nothing about the Army or Navy. Bulpitt also tartly suggests that possibly 'the English working classes were never as stupid or deferential as Corrigan and Sayer seem to infer', a criticism echoed by, among others, Cronin and Lachmann. Both problems were consequences of our decision to concentrate on what, we thought, the existing literature for the most part did not address – state formation as cultural revolution. But there was a price to pay for this, and it may, in retrospect, have been too high. An account which employs a chronological presentation and says little about what 'the state' was formed against, either externally or internally, is liable to be misread as teleological and functionalist; and this is perhaps especially true in view of our emphasis on 'continuities', on which we shall say more below. Some clarification of our position on these issues is called for.

We agree completely with Bulpitt that 'no serious survey of English history could fail to stress the impact of external pressures', concurring with Charles Tilly on the limitations of *any* purely internalist narrative of state formation. Had the Spanish Armada succeeded in 1588 the history of English state formation might have been very different (perhaps, then, there might have been no capitalism to explain, or English 'anomalies' in that regard for social theorists to explain away). The loss of Calais in 1558 symbolizes a kind of turning-point after which imperial ambitions moved from Europe to the Atlantic and beyond, possibly saving England from the fate so illuminatingly analysed for successive Great Powers by Paul Kennedy. Reliance upon the Navy rather than a standing army had internal implications. The Crown lacked one critical prerequisite for absolutism, while the landed classes, as Aylmer suggests,[7] may have been more willing to tax themselves when to do so was not to dig the grave of their own ascendancy. More generally the fact that, alone of European states, England was not successfully invaded or occupied in over nine hundred years has a probable bearing on the continuities in its state forms. We discussed few such factors in any detailed way. However, in this book we were *not* venturing 'a survey of English history', or even offering a *causal* analysis of English state formation, as such. Our objective was rather to reorient thinking on what state formation is.



Bulpitt's criticism of our focus upon England, as distinct from Britain or the United Kingdom, is somewhat ironic in this connection. We would argue that to treat the nation state as an unproblematic framework within which history is written, as many historians and sociologists do, rather than as a representation whose construction is an historical problem, as we attempted, projects back onto the past a sense of society that is itself a facet of state formation, and conspires in the reconstructions of historical memory fundamental to that imagined community. We drew attention to the then rather isolated voices of Pocock and Bailyn, both of whom were calling for a rethinking of 'British history'. Others since, from J. C. D. Clark to Raphael Samuel, have also criticized the usual naming of parts in terms of the whole which claims them. The long making of English state forms *as* 'British' involves a complicated dialectic of both internal externality (the many 'dark corners of the land', geographical, social and cultural) and external internality (the places and peoples institutionalized into successive Empires, in ways that came to define for different times what to be 'British' meant). There is a long history both of borrowing from abroad and export of English models of civility, which began within the 'British' Isles. Ireland, Scotland and Wales were certainly never merely objects of English domination. But equally they certainly were dominated by England, and this domination enduringly marked what Britain became. That their 'neglect' in a study of English state formation can register as odd is itself testimony to the cultural power of nationality as defined from Westminster.

We would respond similarly to Lachman and Cronin. Agreed, we did not do enough, in the marrow of our account, to tell the story 'from below'. Arguably we did not, especially in earlier chapters, sufficiently bring out conflicts within the political nation, or attend enough to the details of political management, either. But nor did we say that English workers – or any other subordinated group – were mere cultural dupes. We never once asserted that they were 'deferential', still less stupid. The latter was indeed a very widespread view from Society, as we showed in Chapter 6. What we tried to do was rather to point to the centrality of patriarchal regulation and representation in the making of England's capitalist society, and the discrepancy of the latter from purely contractual ideal-types of capitalism. Other recent historical studies, like those of Keith Wrightson, have done the same. This was the world with which the variously subordinated *had no choice* but to engage, a world ever defined and differentiated by power.

Nor (as some of our reviewers assumed) were we speaking of 'ruling ideologies', on which topic we would largely agree with Abercrombie, Hill and Turner: their real importance lies more in giving moral authority to the actions of rulers than in securing the consent of the governed. Derek Sayer has since discussed one striking example of such authorization in his study of the 1919 Amritsar massacre.[8] Indians were neither required nor expected to approve of Dyer's slaughter. On the contrary, the ethos which moralized his killings as being in 'the interests of the Indian people themselves' (we quote Lord Salisbury) was predicated on a construction of Indians as children, incapable of giving rational consent at all. We have met many parallels within the pages of this book. The standard sociological uses of terms like ideology or hegemony are grossly anachronistic. They assume that culture of representation whose extension to all as anything other than 'virtually represented' came in England only very late in the day indeed. Even then, as we somewhat profusely stressed, subjects of his or her Majesty continued to be multiply differentiated within the imagined community of state, most of them, much of the time, being spoken for.

Cultural revolution, as we use the concept, is never just an ideational matter. It is both more material and more violent than that, a question of forming the landscape in which people live their lives and therewith *deforming* other loci of identity and foci of identification. Social identities, we argued, are regulated – not constituted – in the routines of state. What individuals are permitted to be is constrained, in what are often exceedingly forceful ways. It was this violence, not some free-floating ideological hegemony, to which we sought most to direct attention. With Weber, we believe that 'every state is founded on force'. What we tried to show is that the force extends very far beyond 'bodies of armed men, prisons, etc.', to embrace the entire repertoire of routines through which normality is rendered obvious. Certainly such violence (including that of the armies, prisons and workhouses) in turn underpins both *habitus* and consent, but this too is material. Not only do states oppress collectivities, they empower individuals, in differentiated and differentiating ways – husbands against wives, gentlemen against labourers, Englishmen against Irish, Anglicans against Catholics – as agents in the social arena which state regulation seeks to concert. In the world-as-is we do *have to* earn our living, get born, married, divorced and buried – each such event being duly registered – educate our children, pass driving tests, obtain mortgages, passports, and social insurance numbers. Through such minutiae approved social identities for individuals are defined, and it is exceedingly difficult to get by without them, in either sense of the word. This is sociology's



*Lebenswelt*, the world in which we live and which itself lives in us; and in England its normalization has a very long history.

The power with which we were concerned in this book was the power, materialized in the routines and sanctified in the rituals of state, to determine the terms on which *any* of these quotidian things are done. This is far more than ideology. It is a highly materialistic organization of the most fundamental times – the working week, the school year, the ages of majority and consent – and spaces – home, work, public, private, and national – of social existence. Which is to say of individual subjectivities: male and female, adult and child, citizen and alien, master and servant. Claude Denis captures the essence of the matter when in a discussion of this book he concludes that a state 'is not in or above society, a state *is* a society' – an organization of social identities, at once totalizing and individualizing.[9]

It is from this standpoint that we approach a final set of criticisms. These go to the heart of what we were trying to do. According to Walter Arnstein, we are overly given to proclaiming 'truisms of English constitutional history with a breathless air of discovery'. And in endorsing these, says Geoff Eley, we fall into an 'inflated conception of continuities', a criticism echoed by Christopher Hill.[10] In fact, our conception of England's state formation is very far from (what is usually thought to be) a Whiggish one. We recounted a series of long waves of *revolution* within which these continuities were reconstructed, traditions invented or – and this is perhaps most typically English – the old reordered to suit the needs of the new. Our emphasis was on the *flexibility* of England's state forms, their capacity to change mightily whilst appearing to stay the same; and this we related to another truism of English constitutional history, the centre/locality linkages which always anchored 'the state' in the political nation even as that nation changed. Our quotation from Blackstone on Coke (p. 79) can stand for much here. That during the 1530s an unprecedented centralization of jurisdiction could be accomplished through a parliamentary statute 'for recontinuing certain liberties and franchises heretofore taken from the Crown' (p. 48), or that the two decades which produced fundamental and lasting changes in state forms as revolutionary as any in English history should be capped off by a 'Restoration', says much about English political culture. To be sure, English continuities are more often of form and symbol than of substance. But symbol and form, we sought to show, are themselves critical media of power. From this point of view the English polity might well occasion breathlessness.

If state power hinges in large part on regulation of social identities, then the fact that the English state was organized on the basis of little changed internal and external boundaries and governed through a set

of institutions which (at the least) could plausibly be represented as both ancient in origin and unbroken in their development over the best part of a millenium is hardly incidental to its resilience and power. This is an organization of the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of social identity – a placing of subjects in the spaces of the nation and the times of its history – of remarkable solidity and depth, which is without parallel in Europe. State forms were the material means through which community was imagined as nation and individuals located as subjects, in ways which empowered some and made of most what John Locke called 'objects of policy and administration'. That it was to be the society regulated by and represented in *this* state that was to become the 'classic ground' of capitalism may of course be pure coincidence. We rather doubt it. It is more plausible that Shakespeare's scepter'd isle became Marx's and Weber's cradle of capitalism because of its 'peculiarities' rather than in spite of them. Of particular importance here, we have suggested, are the forms of law and the theory and practice of representation distinctive to England,[11] which were the abiding preoccupations of Arnstein's constitutionalists. Both of these long anticipated what Marx and Weber took to be core features of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, and situate in an epochal rupture with the patrimonial traditionalism of 'the past'. To our mind they were seriously mistaken in this latter assumption: and the ways in which they were mistaken ought to force a comprehensive re-evaluation of theories of capitalism, state formation, and the relation between the two (and not only as these relate to England).[12]

Arnstein's truisms are the very sinews of the English state, the secrets of its longevity, its authority, and its power. That Maitland and Stubbs (or Bloch, Tocqueville or Voltaire) addressed them – as did Coleridge, Burke, Hume, Blackstone, Locke, Hobbes, Coke, Shakespeare, Bracton and Bede, good men and true every one! – were for us reasons why they merited prominence, not omission. The tradition of constitutional history we were so unfashionable as to resurrect, however, does not today overly influence studies of state formation, whether in history or the social sciences; as Arnstein himself says, it is 'oft-derided and little read'. This is regrettable. For sociologists and political scientists might learn from Stubbs and Maitland that much that they conventionally take to be definitive of 'the modern state' is ancient, and from Bagehot that magic and incantation do not disappear with rational-legal bureaucracy. Anthropologists might also begin to associate culture more closely with power than is their wont, accustomed as they are to study 'stateless societies'; Eric Wolf saw this book as offering them the possibility of 'injecting new vigor into the ailing culture concept'. Historians, professionalized – as the



Victorians were not – into watertight periods and subject-areas, could benefit equally from their predecessors' attention to the linkages between governance and culture (or what once used to be called national character), and their focus upon the *longue durée*. The nineteenth century is not severed from the eighteenth, or from the eleventh, by the chasms which historianly periodization customarily imposes upon the flow of time in which societies have their being; nor, as we hope this book has amply demonstrated, can the histories of senses of society and self, and of the instrumentalities of state through which these are ordered, be written independently of one another. In short, we think it is high time Stubbs and Maitland *were* 'discovered'. There is much to be said for membership in Arthur Koestler's Society for the Flogging of Dead Horses.

One sign that we may not be alone in this heretical belief can be found in James Campbell's 1989 Stenton Lecture, devoted to the thankless task of rehabilitating William Stubbs.[13] Campbell begins by tracing the extrusion, in England, of medieval history from academic journals and syllabi, commencing with 'a revolution in government which took place in 1958 in the historical journal published at Cambridge, which then ceased to accept articles on medieval history'. Thus does history recapitulate the divides of traditional and modern which have obscured understanding of both within the social sciences, disciplines founded in this imagined gulf between pasts and presents. He concedes that Stubbs had his faults, among them 'teleology': 'he fell into the same trap into which Aristotle, Augustine, Gibbon and Marx fell: no doubt about it'. He writes incisively and wittily on why Stubbs 'sets alarm bells ringing' – unprofessionalism, speculativeness, familiarity (his concepts 'seem no less rebarbative than stale'), and above all 'a morbid fear of anachronism' – all criticisms some have levelled at *The Great Arch*. Campbell laments the circumstance that today most English historians appear content to abandon 'the largest issues and the most arresting questions' of comparative history 'to foreigners and to sociologists'. For quite simply, 'the nature and origins of the English state, the mysteries of its long continuity and power, are truly interesting, and not simply for us alone, for that state and those institutions have not been without their influence on the world at large'. That is why we wrote this book. Our answers may be improved upon. But we think we *have* been asking pertinent questions, old as they might very well be – as old, one could say, as the Norman yoke; and these are questions which have more than a little bearing on the present state of the nation, not to mention the three corners of the world over which, at one time or another, the great arch has cast its long shadow.

This present, as Professor Kishlansky so perspicaciously noticed,

was our central concern. It remains so. Recently, this best of all possible worlds has been hailed as the end of history. It should come as no great surprise to readers that we disagree. But Fukuyama[14] might check another work, remarkably congruent in its conception of the sources of state power with this one, which anatomizes (in its author's own words) 'the rituals and routines of power'; an essay all the more significant in that it emanates from that corner of the world whose recent upheavals have led to this premature celebration of the *finis historiae*. It argues that the 'post-totalitarian' system stands 'as a kind of warning to the West, revealing to it its own latent tendencies'. Václav Havel's text, well known, but we suspect little read by Margaret Thatcher, George Bush, and others of the Czech President's self-professed western admirers, bears the curious title *The Power of the Powerless*.[15]

Havel's essay, written and circulated in *samizdat* in 1978 but only translated into English in 1986, concludes exactly where *The Great Arch* did:

> The real question is whether the 'brighter future' is really always so distant. What if, on the contrary, it has been here for a long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from developing it?

As he makes abundantly clear, Havel is not talking of capitalism or 'democracy of the traditional parliamentary type'. Like us he looks towards the 'prefigurations' of what we called 'a new moral order, a new kind of civilization, a different socialization' in struggles against 'living within the lie', and is congenitally suspicious of any and all prefabricated political recipes for the cookshops of the future. That 'within' is exactly the point: we inhabit the lie which colonizes us. The main thrust of Havel's argument is to celebrate as strengths in forms of resistance what are more often viewed as their weaknesses, the fact that they are *not* nationalized, hierarchized, routinized structures, mirror-images of that machinery of state which, in one of the greatest tragedies of this century, socialists thought they could capture and use for emancipatory ends. The trouble is that this state never was a machine, but an organization of our very identities which misrepresents who we are and fetters what we might become. Rather, Havel argues, 'right here, in our everyday lives certain challenges are already . . . encoded, quietly waiting for the moment when they will be read and grasped'. In Czechoslovakia in 1978 this must have been difficult to imagine. Normalization (as the government called it) seemed total, all resistance eccentric, quixotic, a paltry and insignificant thing. Havel, in the words of Ladislav Adamec, was 'a nobody'.

Establishments, both Marxist and academic, were caught short by the events of 1989 in 'Eastern Europe'. It was inconceivable that millions of ordinary people would find the resources around and within them to bring down, in the case of Czechoslovakia in a bloodless ten days, states whose power looked unassailable. But the power of the state, seemingly so total, can often be fragile as gossamer. It must be, because it rests on a lie: it is Philip Abrams' collective misrepresentation, and is daily experienced as untrue by those whom it individually misrepresents. There is a warning for 'the West' here too. Perhaps, since 1989 has shown – not for the first, nor yet for the last time – the power of the powerless, the resources we spoke of, in all that state formation has organized itself, and sought to organize us, against, might be easier to conceive than they were in 1985. Perhaps, too, our insistence on the need to seek emancipatory forms which express rather than suppress the differences denied and fragmented in the totalizing languages of state – what Tom Nairn, in *The Enchanted Glass*, derided as our 'socialist redemptionism' – might be seen as having some, shall we say, empirical evidence in its support. This is not to underestimate the 'great difficulty' to which G. E. Aylmer alluded in his Foreword, by way of his apt quotation from James Madison. But we would still end this book where we did in 1985: imagine.



## Notes to Postscript

1 Reviews of *The Great Arch* are listed in the Bibliographic Supplement. Where not given in these notes, publication details of other works discussed in this Postscript are provided there.
2 J. Campbell 1986; P. Wormald 1986 and work in progress; cf. Fell, 1984.
3 J. Barry 1991 cf. Innes, 1991.
4 E. Wolf 1988.
5 P. Corrigan 1990a; b; 1991; D. Sayer 1991a; forthcoming.
6 D. Sayer and G. Nair forthcoming.
7 G. E. Aylmer 1990.
8 D. Sayer 1991b.
9 C. Denis 1989.
10 C. Hill 1986.
11 Distinctive, at least, in their survival; in origin they may well have drawn on a Germanic and Carolingian heritage common to much of north-west Europe.
12 Derek Sayer, 1992, has elaborated on this argument.
13 J. Campbell 1989.
14 F. Fukuyama 1989a and ensuing debate.
15 V. Havel 1987.

# Bibliographical Supplement

This is a very brief selection of relevant studies, published since 1984 or omitted from the bibliography to the original edition of this book. It is in *no* sense intended to be comprehensive. Our abbreviations follow those originally used.

1 *Reviews/review essays of* The Great Arch

*Am Ethnologist* (Eric R. Wolf), 14(2) 1987.
*AHR* (Walter L. Arnstein), 92, 1987, 123–4; see also *idem*, *Communications*, 92, 1987, 1331–2.
*Am J Sociol* (James E. Cronin), 92(3) 1986.
*Annals of the Am Academy of Arts and Sciences* (Geoff Eley), 489, 1987.
*Das Argument* (Roland Axtmann), 1986, 921–3.
*Australian J Pol and Hist* (Hugh V. Emy), 33(1), 1987.
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*Canadian Rev Sociol and Anthropology* (Bruce Curtis) 24(4) 1987.
*Comp Studs in Soc and Hist* (Eileen Yeo), 31(4) 1989.
*Cont Sociol* (Richard Lachmann) 15(4) 1986.
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*Teaching History*, February 1987.
*THES* (Mark Kishlansky), 12 September 1986.

2 *Extensions and new work: or items 'missed' in relation to the original edition*

*In general*: periodical articles have not been included unless referred to in the Postscript; and individual contributions from the *Journal of Historical Sociology* have not been cited, despite their individual relevance and the overall significance of the Journal. Note also section 3(1) below, New Journals.

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